“Sexual violence is a horrific reality that continues to plague this country.” (Quoted in judgment below)
It’s often said that victims of rape and other types of sexual violence have to suffer twice – firstly at the hands of the rapist and secondly at the hands of the law.
A recent High Court ruling on the knotty question of consent could go some way towards remedying this. At the heart of the matter is the delicate balance between a victim’s right to be treated with dignity and compassion in their quest for justice, and the accused’s right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty in a fair trial.
The consent conundrum
To secure a conviction of sexual violence the State must prove – beyond reasonable doubt – the absence of consent to the accused person’s actions. Unfortunately, major injustices have resulted in the past from the fact that many perpetrators escaped conviction by simply claiming that they believed that consent had in fact been given – without having to show that their belief was in any way reasonable.
Two shocking acquittals
The Court referred to two practical examples of grave injustice rooted in the current wording of the Criminal Laws (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act:
- A woman had agreed to oral sex only, but her then-boyfriend proceeded to perform full penetrative sex. He claimed that her body language gave tacit consent to penetration and that he misconstrued her request to him to stop as a request to pause momentarily. He was acquitted on the basis that his version was “reasonable and possibly true, although his explanation was improbable”. The complainant had not objectively consented, but the State had not proved beyond reasonable doubt that his version that he genuinely believed that there was at least tacit consent, was false. The court considered itself bound to acquit “unless it is satisfied not only that the explanation is improbable but that beyond any reasonable doubt it is false.”
- In the second case, a woman was raped by a man she met through an online dating site. He had invited her to his home for a “party” at which she turned out to be the only guest. The perpetrator was acquitted on the basis that, although the victim had not objectively consented to the penetration, “she neither physically resisted nor loudly protested. The State did not exclude the possibility that the accused did not hear her say ‘no’ and did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that he was aware that she was not consenting. Put differently, the court accepted that he had subjectively believed that there was consent.”
Enter a welcome new limit to the consent defence
The courts in question had no choice but to acquit given the Act’s present wording, and as the High Court put it: “Currently … an unreasonable belief in the presence of consent is a defence. The State bears the extraordinarily high burden to prove that the accused’s claim that he [it could of course have been a “she”] was under the impression that consent had been given is not reasonably possibly true.”
It accordingly held the relevant sections of the Act to be unconstitutional and invalid and ordered that they be read such that “…it is not a valid defence for that accused person to rely on a subjective belief that the complainant was consenting to the conduct in question, unless the accused took objectively reasonable steps to ascertain that the complainant consented to [the] sexual conduct in question.” (Emphasis supplied).
How will our courts interpret this in practice?
Based on the Act’s current wording, our courts have previously held that, “where there was no express rejection of the sexual act … consent has the following requirements: (a) the consent itself must be recognised by law; (b) it must be real consent; and (c) it must be given by a person capable of consent.”
Assuming the Constitutional Court upholds the High Court’s declaration of invalidity, we can only guess how our criminal courts will ultimately interpret whatever new wording it and parliament (which has 18 months to amend the Act) finally settle on. But something like the five-point common sense definition of consent given in Amnesty International’s article “Let’s Talk About Consent” may well form the basis of judicial interpretation down the line.
The article further suggests that “Consent is not about signing a contract! It’s about communication and about making sure all sexual activities happen with mutual consent.” Which seems like a fair and practical way of looking at it.
The bottom line?
One would hope that our courts will ultimately decide that only a genuine, unequivocal, unpressured, informed, specific and un-retracted “Yes” will be enough to escape conviction.
As a final thought, remember that this new law only comes into force if and when the Constitutional Court confirms it.
Disclaimer: The information provided herein should not be used or relied on as professional advice. No liability can be accepted for any errors or omissions nor for any loss or damage arising from reliance upon any information herein. Always contact your professional adviser for specific and detailed advice.
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